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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
and defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in this
area. 2
The court further held that the officer, being lawfully on the
fire escape, had "[p] robable cause to enter the apartment once he
discovered a loaded handgun on the fire escape and observed in
plain view what appeared to be contraband and drug
paraphernalia." 26 Additionally, the court found that due to a
potential threat of harm to the investigating police at the location,
given the radio report of two men having a dispute and the
discovery of the gun, exigent circumstances existed.2Y
While both the federal law and the state law in regard to the
prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure have similar
statutory language, New York courts will look at the totality of
the circumstances to determine if a police officer had the
necessary reasonable suspicion and whether the defendant lacked
an expectation of privacy, in order to justify a warrantless
search.2
People v. Turriago"
(decided May 13, 1997)
Defendant, Leonard Turriago, was convicted in the Supreme
Court, New York County of various criminal charges.30 On
25 Id. (citing People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 505 N.E.2d 586, 513
N.Y.S.2d 75 (1987) (asserting that the defendant must show he was a victim of
an invasion of privacy to establish the illegality of a warrantless search and
seizure); United States v. Arboleda, 633 F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding no
constitutional violation occurred when a police detective broke into an
apartment through a window after the defendant threw a package of cocaine
onto the fire escape)).
2Id.
27 Id. at 1007, 679 N.E.2d at 637, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
28 Id. at 162, 505 N.E.2d at 588, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring )).
2990 N.Y.2d 77, 681 N.E.2d 350, 659 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1997).
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appeal to the Appellate Division, defendant's convictions were
reversed on his motion to suppress physical evidence and his
incriminating statements .3  The People appealed the intermediate
court decision on grounds that the defendant's constitutional
rights were not violated pursuant to the United States
Constitution32 and the New York State Constitution.33
On appeal, the State made two arguments: (1)"the requirement
of a founded suspicion of criminal activity does not apply when
the police seek consent to search a vehicle following a stop" 34 and
(2)the inevitable discovery doctrine should have been applied to
deny the defendant's suppression motion.35  The Appellate
Division held that the police did not conduct the search of the
defendant's vehicle. 6 Conflicting testimony was introduced
regarding whether the state troopers requested consent to search
the vehicle or whether coercive tactics were employed to gain
access to the vehicle revealing the body of a deceased victim.37
Under these circumstances, the First Department found that
consent was not given by the defendant which resulted in an
abridgment of his rights to be protected from illegal searches and
seizures.3' The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Divisionerred in not applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to the
30 Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d at 80, 681 N.E.2d at 351, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 184
(1997) "[Defendant was convicted] of murder in the second degree, of
weapons and cocaine possession and tampering with physical evidence." Id.
"' Id. at 80, 681 N.E.2d at 351, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part "[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... " Id.
33 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This section provides in pertinent part "IT]he.
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " Id.
3 Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d at 80, 681 N.E.2d at 351, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
This argument was not preserved by the State during the trial and the court
concluded that the issue was "beyond the jurisdiction of [the] court." Id.
351 Id. at 80, 681 N.E.2d at 351, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
36 id.
371d. at 81-82, 681 N.E.2d at 352, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
38 Id. at 83, 681 N.E.2d at 353, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
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secondary evidence which resulted from an apartment search after
taking defendant into custody.39 It is recognized that the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule can apply
to permit the use of secondary evidence received from primary
evidence obtained illegally.'
On November 20, 1990 at 2:00 in the morning the defendant
was stopped by State Police in upstate New York for a speeding
violation.41  According to the police, a consent search was
requested because the hunting season began and they were
concerned about unlicensed hunters carrying loaded weapons in
their vehicles to hunt deer at night.42 The search revealed the
corpse of Fernando Cuervo lodged in the trunk. 4" At this time,
the defendant fled, but was later apprehended along with the
other occupants in the van.' Traffic tickets were issued for
speeding and a check on the status of the operator's license was
conducted.45 It was found that the operator's license was
suspended and another summons was issued for violation of the
vehicle and traffic law.' The police used information gathered
from the defendant and his companions to obtain search warrants
to enter the defendant's apartment.47 Accordingly, the same
information was used to retrieve the gun used by the killer which
was discarded in the Hudson River prior to the trip upstate.48
The police seized evidence of the murder; firearms and a large
quantity of cocaine were retrieved from Turriago's apartment.49
The People urged the Court of Appeals to find that the consent to
search the vehicle was not coerced and that, if it was coerced,
39 Id. at 88, 681 N.E.2d at 356, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
40 Id. at 86, 681 N.E.2d at 355, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 188 (citing People v. Stith,
69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1987)).
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"the People's evidence was admissible under the inevitable
discovery doctrine." 50
The Turriago court indicated that in People v. Fitzpatrick, it
recognized the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusion of
evidence "tainted by illegal police procedures ... ,. In
Fitzpatrick, the defendant was accused of holding up an attendant
at a gas station where he was stopped by two officers." Mr.
Fitzpatrick proceeded to shoot both officers and fled the crime
scene.53 One of the officers was able to radio in to inform others
that he had been shot by the defendant.54  Police gained
information regarding the address of the defendant and entered
his home without a warrant where officers found defendant
hiding in a closet.55 The officers questioned the defendant about
the gun and he admitted that it was on the shelf in the closet. 6
The court reasoned in Fitzpatrick that the inevitable discovery
factor should be invoked because the police naturally would have
looked for incriminating evidence in the closet where the
defendant was hiding.57 Further analysis suggests that there was
no need for a search or arrest warrant because probable cause
existed .58
50 Id. at 82, 681 N.E.2d at 353, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 186. The inevitable
discovery rule is an exception to the exclusionary rule which permits evidence
to be admitted in a criminal case, even though it was obtained unlawfully,
when the government can show that discovery of the evidence by lawful
means was inevitable. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 777 (6th ed. 1990).
"' Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d at 84, 681 N.E.2d at 354, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 187
(citing People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d
793 (1973)).
52 Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d at 503, 300 N.E.2d at 140, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
53 Id.
54 Id.
" Id. at 504, 300 N.E.2d at 140, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
5 6
Id.
57 Id. at 507, 300 N.E.2d at 142, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 797. The court stated that
the next most reasonable place for the police to search would have been the
closet. Id.
58 Id. at 509, 300 N.E.2d at 143, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 799. In the interest of
protecting lives, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to
1174 [Vol 14
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The People contest the decision of the Appellate Division in
Turriago by requesting that an exception to the exclusionary rule
be applied to warrant the use of secondary evidence for
evidentiary purposes.59  Secondary evidence may be admitted
under the exception even though it has been obtained from
"tainted primary evidence. " '°  In People v. Stith,6' the police
arrested and charged the defendant with criminal possession of a
weapon when police discovered a gun in an unlawful search of
the cab of the defendant's truck tractor.' Upon retrieval of the
revolver, the police performed a radio check where they found
that the defendant's license was expired and the truck was
stolen.' The court reversed defendant's conviction of criminal
possession of the weapon because the illegal search contravened
constitutional and state law.6' Yet, the court considered the fact
that the truck was stolen to be grounds for a legitimate conviction
because such evidence is construed to be admissible secondary
evidence.' Following the reasoning in Stith, the Turriago court
allowed the evidence regarding the apartment to be admitted as
secondary evidence where the primary evidence of the body
should be inadmissible. 66
delay in the course of an investigation." Id. (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1966)).
59 People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 82, 681 N.E.2d 350, 353, 659
N.Y.S.2d 183, 186 (1997).
60 Id. at 86, 681 N.E.2d at 355, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
61 69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201 203 (1987).
62 Id. at 317, 506 N.E.2d at 913, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 203.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 318, 506 N.E.2d at 914, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 204. The court will apply
the inevitable discovery rule to secondary evidence. "[E]vidence illegally
obtained during or as the immediate consequence of [improper] police conduct
[will be excluded, while] evidence obtained indirectly as a result of leads or
information gained from that primary evidence [will be admissible]." Id.
65 Id. at 316, 506 N.E.2d at 912, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 202. The Court of
Appeals modified the Appellate Division on the grounds that only the
conviction for stolen property should be maintained. Id.
66 People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 88, 681 N.E.2d 350, 356, 659
N.Y.S.2d 183, 189 (1997). The Court of Appeals relied upon the Stith
1998 1175
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In New York v. Payton6 , the New York Court of Appeals
expanded the scope of the word "inevitable" as it applies in the
inevitable discovery doctrine.6 8 The court suggested that a "very
high degree of probability" is required to allow evidence to be
admissible if such evidence may be obtained "independently of
the tainted source."69  Similar to Fitzpatrick"z and Stith,7 a
warrantless entry by the police was conducted in Payton.7 2 The
Court of Appeals held that a warrantless entry made to effect a
felony arrest, if based on probable cause, is not violative of a
defendant's constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 7 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court
of the United States overruled New York's position regarding
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 74
In Payton, Justice Wachtler dissenting explaining that the
inevitable discovery doctrine should not apply because the police
would not discover the location of the gun dealer under normal
police procedures.75 According to Fitzpatrick, the inevitability of
discovering evidence subsequent to an illegal search is determined
decision to the extent that it would not preclude secondary evidence under the
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Id.
67 Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 402, rev'd 445
U.S. 573 (1980).
68 Payton, 45 N.Y.2d at 313, 380 N.E.2d at 231, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The
court indicated that the term "inevitable discovery" is inaccurate and "[w]hat
is required is that there be a very high degree of probability that the evidence
in question would have been obtained independently of the tainted source."
Id.
69 Id.
70 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1973).
71 69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201 203 (1987).
72 Id.
73 45 N.Y.2d at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 225, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396, rev'd 445
U.S. 573 (1980).
74 See Payton v. New York, 45 U.S. 573 (1980).
75 Payton, 45 N.Y.2d at 316, 380 N.E.2d at 232, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 403,
rev'd 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
1176 [Vol 14
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by looking in "the next most reasonable place." 76  Justice
Wachtler emphasized that there were hundreds of reasonable
places to look for the dealer who sold the murder weapon in
Payton.
77
The Court noted in Payton that the exclusionary rule is
designed to "ensure] that the prosecution is not put in a worse
position simply because of some earlier police error or
misconduct." 78 The Supreme Court disfavors unreasonable
searches or seizures conducted without a warrant.79 Moreover,
the Court draws no distinction between the seizure of persons or
property; the constitutional protection afforded to both categories
are the same.8° It is worthy to note that the New York Court of
Appeals has upheld warrantless entries to arrest persons although
countered by a constitutional attack."1
There exists a dissimilarity between the application of the
search and seizure doctrine as it is delineated in the federal and
New York State courts. Turriago relied upon state precedent as it
related to the question of whether primary or secondary evidence
would be admissible having been elicited from prior police
misconduct.' In Turriago, the prosecution did not meet the
necessary burden to demonstrate that the primary evidence would
have naturally been discovered, but it had the opportunity to
76 Id. at 317, 380 N.E.2d at 233, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (Vachler, J.,
dissenting).
77 Id. (Wachler, J., dissenting).
78 People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 85, 681 N.E.2d 350, 353, 659
N.Y.S.2d 183, 186 (1997).
79 Payton, 445 U.S. 573. "Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted
without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the [Fourth]
Amendment." Id. "[Aibsent exigent circumstances... [t]he suspect's
interest in the sanctity of his home... outweighs the governmental interests."
Id. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
go Id. at 585. "[A]n entry to arrest and an entry to search for and to seize
property implicate the same interest in preserving the privacy and the sanctity
of the home, and justify the same level of constitutional protection." Id. at
588.
81 Id. at 600.
82 See Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d at 77, 681 N.E.2d at 350, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
1998 1177
7
et al.: Search and Seizure
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAWREVIEW
prove that the secondary evidence should have been admitted.83
As long as New York allows police to conduct warrantless
searches and seizures, a New York court must demonstrate that
its decision is based solely on a state constitutional provision to be
immune from review by the Supreme Court.84
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. LaFontaine8 5
(decided November 6, 1997)
Defendant, Sixto LaFontaine, was indicted for criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.86 The
defendant moved to suppress the evidence87 seized by New Jersey
police officers arguing that the officers lacked authority to make
the arrest."8 Moreover, defendant claimed that his arrest violated
83 Id. at 88, 681 N.E.2d. at 356, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 189. "[B]y invoking a
state constitutional provision, a state court immunizes its decision from review
by this Court." Id.
84 Payton, 445 U.S. at 600."
85 235 A.D.2d 93, 664 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1st Dep't), appeal granted, 91
N.Y.2d 883, 691 N.E.2d 654, 668 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1997).
86Id. at 95, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
87 See N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 710.20 (McKinney 1997). This section
provides in pertinent part:
Upon motion of a defendant who (a) is aggrieved by unlawful
or improper acquisition of evidence and has reasonable cause
to believe that such may be offered against him in a criminal
action... a court may, under circumstances prescribed in
this article, order that such evidence be suppressed or
excluded upon the ground that it: (1) Consists of tangible
property obtained by means of an unlawful search and
seizure under circumstances precluding admissibility thereof
in a criminal action against such defendant.
Id.
88 LaFontaine, 235 A.D.2d at 95, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 589.
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